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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LARRY HOLLINGSWORTH
d/b/a THE KING'S PALACE &
RUSTY HANNA, et al.,
d/b/a THE SOCIETY OF
LICENSED MASSEURS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

No. 16,831

THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE,

a Municipal Corporation,
CLINT BALMFORTH, and THE
SOUTH SALT LAKE POLICE DEPARTMENT

Defendants-Respondents.

NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellants contest the validity of South Salt
Lake City Ordinances regulating massage parlors, particularly
those prohibiting massages by members of the opposite
sex.

This appeal arises from a judgment entered against

appellants in the Third Judicial Court of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judge Homer Wilkinson of the Third Judicial Court
of Utah has sustained the validity of the South Salt
Lake City Ordinances.

His decision is based in part

on a similar ordinance enacted by Salt Lake County.
Judge Wilkinson also upheld the validity of the County
Ordinances in the matter of Redwood Gym et al., v. Salt
Lake County Commission et al. which is also pending
before this court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek an order reversing the decision
of the Third Judicial Court, with instructions to
declare sections of the revised ordinances of South
Salt Lake null and void.

Appellants alternatively

reuqest that the matter be remanded to the Third Judicial
Court of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents agree with appellants' statement of
facts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UN1TED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS CPHELD
OPPOSITE-SEX MASSAGE ORDINANCES.
NUMEROUS JURISDICTIONS
HAVE ALSO UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SUCH ORDINANCES.
The constitutionality of ordinances regulating
opposite-sex massages has been affirmed and upheld by
state and federal courts throughout the country.
A landmark case dealing with such ordinances was
the California Appellate Court decision of Ex parte Maki,
56 Cal.A;;. 635, 133 P.2d 64 which stated at 64:
The ordinance forbidding administration of
mass~ges ~o persons of .opp~site sex is not unconstituti

as violating the constitutional provisions that no
perso~ shall on ac?ount of sex be disqualified from
pursuing any vocation. Const. Art. 20 Sec. lS.

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and further stating at 64:
a(n) owner, convicted of violating ordinance
by calling in a masseuse to administer massage
to male patron, could not complain on ground
that ordinance violated constitutional provisions
that no person shall on account of sex be disqualified
from pursuing any vocation. Const~ Art. 20, Sec. 18.
Since this decision,

this issue has been

extensively litigated on all levels of the judicial
system, and extended assertions of its constitutionality
presented.

Patterson v. Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Civ

App 1962) , held that ordinance prohibiting opposite-sex
massages in a massage establishment was not arbitrary,
discriminatory, or unreasonable and did not violate
due process clauses of state or federal constitutions,
or deny equal protection of the law.

(U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.

14.) .
Further, cases on the state level have endorsed or
adopted the constitutionality of regulatory statutes
and ordinances:

City of Houston v. Shober, 362 S.W.2d

886 {Tex Civ App. 1962); Connell v. State, 371 S.W.2d 45
(Tex. Crim. 1964);

Thompson v. City of Huntsville, 329

So.2d 664 (Crim.App. 1976);

Oueilhe v. Lovell, 560

P.2d 1348 (.Nev.Sup.Ct. 1977}.
The United States Supreme Court has aditionally
determined that opposite-sex massage ordinances do not
violate the Constitution of the United States in either
-3-
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limiting equal protection or abridging due process
clauses.

In Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct.

2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975), the Supreme court dismissed
the case for want of a substantial federal question,
such dismissal affirming that opposite-sex massage
ordinances did not violate the United States
Constitution.

Other cases were dismissed on the

same basis and include: Patterson v. Dallas, supra,
Kisley v. Falls Church, 212 Va. 693, 187 S.E.2d 168
{Va.Sup.Ct. 1972), 409 U.S. 907, 93 S.Ct. 237, 34 L.Ed 2d
169 (1972);
2d 203,

Smith v. Keator, 285 N.C. 530, 206 S.E.

{N.C. Sup. Ct. 1974), 419 U.S. 1043, 95 S.Ct. 613,

42 L.Ed. 2d 636 (1974); Rubenstein v. Township of
Cherry Hill, No. 10,027, unreported,

(N.J. Sup.Ct.

1974),

41 7 U. S • 9 6 3 , 9 4 S . Ct • 316 5 , 4 1 L . Ed • 2 d 11 3 6 {19 7 4 ) ;
City of Indianapolis v. Wright, 371 N.E. 2d 1298
(Ind. Sup.Ct. 1977), 439 U.S. 804, 99 s.ct. 60, 58 L.Ed
2d 97 ( 1978) •
Hogge v. Johnson, 526 F.2d 833 (4th Circuit 1975),
cert. denied, 428

u.s.

913, 96 s.ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed 2d

1221, at page 835, summarized the reasoning behind a
federal court dismissal based on lack of a substantial
federal question:
Quite recently, the Uni~ed States Supreme Court
has spoken to the q~estion ar.tong the circuits with
respect to the meaning to be accorded dismissal

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for want of a substantial federal question.
Such a dismissal is a decision on the merits
binding upon the inferior federal courts.
It is stare decisis on issues properly
presented to the court an~ declared by that
court to be without substance.
The decision in Hogge v. Johnson, supra, regarding
lack of a substantial federal question, influenced
later decisions on the question of appeals on the
grounds of constitutionality.
Ltd. v. Rizzo, 387 F.Supp. 690

Colorado Springs Amusements,
(E ..

D.

Pa.

19741, rev'd

524 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S.
913, 96 S.Ct. 3228, 49 L.Ed 2d 1222., challenges Philadelphia's
opposite-sex massage parlor ordinances charging that
assumptions were made as to 1) group characteristics
rather than the merits of the individual, 2) illicit
sexual conduct occurring as a result of a massage by
a member of the opposite sex, 3) and that the ordinance
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by forcing them
to discriminate in their hiring, among others.
After reviewing the arguments of the case, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated at 524 F.2d 576:
By parity of reasoning, we are not free to disregard
three dismissals by the Supreme Court for want
of a substantial federal question, of challenges
to the ordinances identical in all material respects
to the one in qu~stion here. A reading of the appeal
papers shows that the orders dismissing the appeals
are precedent for rejecting all but two of the
contentions raised in opposition to section

-5-
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9-610(4) of the Philadelphia Code •.• our
reason in reaching this conclusion is
supported by the similar approach taken by
the Fourth Circuit Court in its recent
decision in Hogge v. Johnson.
Only two cases currently exist which have not
been directly overturned which hold such ordinances
unconstitutio~al:

J.S.K. Enterprises, Inc. v. Lacey,

6 Wash.App. 43, 492 P.2d 600 (Ct.App. 1971), and
City and Countv nf Denver v. Nielson, 572 P.2d 434 (Coln.
Sup.Ct. 1977).

The J.S.K. Enterprises decision was made

prior to the United States Supreme Court's dismissal
for lack of ,a substantial federal question ground, and
has been vitiated by the same.
In the cRse of City and County of Denver v. Nielson,
however, the decision that opposite-sex ordinances were
unconstitutional was based on the Constitution of the
state of Colorado, and not on that of the United States;
the decision; then, being based solely on the laws and
interpretations of a single jurisdiction.
Clearly, the roots of constitutionality in legislating
opposite-sex massages have been established, and the
State of Utah, and the City of South Salt Lake are within
well established boundaries of legality in attempting
regulate such ordinances.

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to

POINT II. THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES DONDT
VIOLATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS.
In order to appropriately address the appellants'
arguments on this point, it is necessary to establish
the boundaries in which Utah defines unconstitutional
discrimination.
State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938)
at page 920 set the following precedent:
to be unconstitutional as discriminatory, the
discrimination of a statute must be unreasonable
or arbitrary and a classification is never
unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or
exclusion features so long as there is some basis
for the differentiation between classes or subject
matters included as compared to those excluded from
its operation and if the differentiation bears a
reasonable relation to the purposes to be
accomplished by the statute. Const. U.S. Amendment
14, Section 1.
Within the ordinance adopted by the City of
South Salt Lake regarding opposite-sex massages, masseuses
and masseurs are treated equally.
both men and women.

It applies equally to

In a similar case in the Supreme

Court of North Carolina, Smith v. Keator, supra, the court
approved the restrictions of the ordinances:
The ordinance applies equally to both men and
women ..• the barrier erected by the ordinance
against immoral acts likely to result from too
intimate familiarity of the sexes is no more
than a reasonable regulation imposed by the
city council in the fair exercise of police

-1~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

powers ••• there is nothing in the ordinance
that denies equal protection guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. It applies to
all alike who give massages for hire and
who are not licensed to practice one of the
arts of healing •.•
Again, in the case of Patterson v. City of
Dallas, supra, this premise was supported, and the
court held the ordinance was valid when it stated
at 842:
The ordinance applies alike to both men and
women.
If petitioner should receive only
male patrons and do his own work or employ
only masseurs, he would not violate the
ordinance.
If he should receive only female
patrons and err.ploy only masseuses to do his
work, there would be no violation. The
barrier erected by the ordinance against
immoral acts likely to result from too
intimate familiarity of the sexes is no
more than a reasonable regulation imposed by
the city council in the fair exercise of
police powers.
In the landmark case of Ex parte Maki, supra, the
appellant argued violation of

anti-discriminat~on

~c~s

found.under Section 18, Article 20 of the Constitution.
The court, however, declared that the ordinance did not
disqualify, on the account of sex, any person from
entering or pursuing any lawful business,

~ocation,

or

profession because the ordinance did not challenge the
right of either man or woman to work as a masseur or to
own such a business.

On that ground, there is no

discrimination.
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Appellants argue that the ordinance is void
as a denial of due process, and is thus contrary to
the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case of Smith v. Keator,

supra, dealing with the constituionality of opposite-sex
massage noted the following at page 209:
"Class legislation" is not offensive to the
Constitution when the classification is based
on a reasonable distinction and the law is
made to apply uniformly to all the members of
the class affected. Or, as the principle is more
often expressed, when the law applies uniformly to
all persons in like situation--which of itself
implies that the classification must have a
reasonable basis, without arbitrary discrimination
between those in like situations.
The appellants' argument

t~at

the City Ordinance

unreasonably infringes upon the right of contract
has no substantial basis.

Notwithstanding the

ordinance, a licensed masseur may spend all of his time
massaging men, and may employ a masseuse to massage
any woman requesting treatment.

Neither the state no--:

the federal constitution guarantees to a person unrestricted
license in pursuing any line of business that he wishes,
as he wishes to do so.

The state may have conditions on

that right, and may apply such restrictions to massage
parlors, just as it does to doctors, lawyers, or
garbage collectors.

As long as the regulatory laws are

not the the result of benefit of private interest, unfair,
or without justifiable ends, regulations are constitutional

-9-
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and enforceable.

Further, because the City has found it

necessary to regulate the business of massage parlors,
but has not comprehended every possible evil that it
must legislate, does not negate the need for, nor the
impact of enacted ordinances.
Finally, to counter the argument concerning a class
being characterized, rather than an individual on the
basis of his/her own merit, and to counter the
argument that because of class characterization,
those honorable, moral, and ethical practitioners are
subjected to regulations designed to prevent immoral acts,
findings by the legislative body to concur,
historically, that the existence of an evil in connection
with massage parlors ·is widespread.

This is sufficient

answer to the complaint of one engaged in the
business, even though he is himself honorable.

He is not

deprived of his property because he must conform to such
legialation.

His own compliance with such measures should

be considered a privelege and a protection against the
further corruption of his legitimate business.
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POINT III. THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES
ARE A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.
The state codes and the judicial decisions of
Utah have historically supported the fact that the exercise
of police power is valid when regulating massage parlor
business.
Citing the same case which the appellants have
used in arguing this point (p. 11, Brief of Appellant),
Hart Health Studio v. Salt Lake County, 577 P.2d 116
(Utah 1978) at 118, the court's opinion was clearly
in favor of police regulation:
It is fundamental that the regulation of
business--and specifically this type of
business--is within the police power
of the state •.. (Emphasis added}.
This case alone is enough to validate the argument
in favor of the respondent as a clear statement of
the Utah Court's sentiment.

Further confirmation of

this expressed authority are upheld in additional
decisions.

Salt Lake City v. Allred, 437 P.2d 434 (Utah

1968) at page 434 states:
It is proper exercise of statutory grant of
police power to municipalities to preserve
and protect public morals, and any practice
of business which has tendency to weaken or
corrupt morals of those who follow it,
as shown by experience, is such conduct as
affects "public morals." U.C.A. 1953, 10-8-84.

-11-
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When rendering the decision on Salt Lake City v.
Allred, the court applied the findings of Salt Lake
City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, P.2d 671 (1938), that found
the grant of general police powers to cities under
predecessor statutes to Section 10-8-84, U.C.A. 1953, it
would appear reasonable that sexual intercourse for hire
and related offenses would be included in such general
police power.
The protection of public morals has always been
a matter of local concern requiring regulation by
municipalities.

It properly falls within the scope of

the police power pertaining to public morals.
Other cases considering similar legislation
reached the same conclusion.

j.s.K. Enterprises, Inc.

v. City of Lacey, supra, at page 600 determined two
significant points:
1) A city, in exercise of its police power,
may regulate massagists on grounds of public
health, safety and morality •.•

and,
2}
Police Power regulation is subject to
provisions of state and federal constitutions
prohibiting granting of special privileges and
immunities and guaranteeing equal protection of
laws, but within limits of such restrictive
rules, legislative body has a wide measure of
discretion and its determination cannot be
successfully attacked unless it is manifest
arbitrary, unreasonable, inequitable, and unjust
(.Emphasis added).
•
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Ex Parte Maki, supra, at page 64, affirms that the
imposition of such ordinances by a city council is in
fair exercise of police powers, and that such
regulation by police powers to maintain the moral
welfare does not arbitrarily deprive a person engaged in
a regulated business of his property without "due
process of law"

(Const. Art I, Section 13, u.s.c.A.

Const. Amend. 14. sec. 1).
Finally, Smith v. Keator, supra, at page 207:
••• after noting that the California case
of Ex parte Maki, supra, was so well decided
that it was decisive of the appeal before
them, held that a city ordinance declaring
that it was unlawful to administrer a massage
to any person of the opposite sex was
a fair exercise of the police power of the
city and that did not violate any constitutional
rights of the licensees of the massage
establishment.

-13-
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POINT IV. THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES
ARE NOT IN CONFLICT WITH UTAH STATE LAW.
In laying a foundation on the basic premises of
this argument, it is important to note two precedents
determined in the case of Salt Lake City v. Allred,
supra, at page 434, in relation to city/state legislation:
1)
There is nothing in state statutes regulating
sexual offenses that evidences any express
or implied intent to preclude local governments
from also attempting to prohibit and suppre33
the difficult problem of the sex offender.
U.C.A. 1953, 76-53-8 to 76-53-12
and,
2)
City has the right to legislate on the
same subject as state statutes where either
general police power or e~press grant of
authority is conferred upon municipalities.
South Salt Lake, in forming legislation dealing
with opposite-sex massages, is in harmony with the
above decision.

Appellants argue that South

Salt Lake has adopted an ordinance "in direct conflict
with the State of Utah" because prostitution means
one thing to the State of Utah and "in South Salt Lake,
it means far more."

The courts have not found such

expansions of definitions either inconsistent or against
legislation.
In State v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318,
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445 P.2d 691 (1968), at page 691, the Supreme Court
of Utah sununarizes their position:
••• where legislature prohibits citizens
from doing some act, there is no basis
to imply that the legislature intended
that cities and counties should not add
additional prohibitions.
By expanding the definition of "prostitution,"
South Salt Lake has, indeed, added prohibitions, and
is therefore within their legal rights as a municipaiity.
This concept is in accordance with Salt Lake City v. Kusse,
supra, where the Utah Supreme Court, in commenting on
various tests to determine whether there is a conflict
between the statute and the

ord~nance

voiced the following

with approval:
The city does not attempt to authorize by
this ordinance what the legislature has forbidden;
nor does it forbid what the legislature has
expressly licensed, authorized, or required.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has also determined
in the case of Layton City v. Speth, 578 P.2d 828,

(Utah

1978} at page 831, the following:
Cities are empowered by statute to pass all
ordinances, rules, and regulations for carrying
into effect all powers and duties conferred and
such as are necessary and proper to provide for the
safety, preserve the health, promote the prosperity,
and improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort
and convenience of the city and its inhabitants.
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Appellant has argued that this ordinance has
exceeded the scope of this definition and is inconsistent
and in conflict with the state laws.

Appellants argue

that the ordinance attempts to make crimes of acts which
are not crimes under state laws.

A review of the South

Salt Lake Ordinances and the relevant sections of the
state laws pertaining to sexual offenses (76-53-8 through
76-53-12) U.C.A. 1953, reveals that both the city
ordinance and the state statute have the common purpose
of defeating the practice of business or prostitution
or the vice of sexual intercourse for hire and
are closely related in subject matter.
Salt Lake City v. Allred provides the Supreme
Court opinion on the matter:
The mere fact that an act denounced as
a crime under the ordinance which is not
denounced as a crime under the statute
would not necessarily render the act
under the ordinance inconsistent
with the statute whereas here the ordinance
is within the scope of state law dealing
with· the same related subject of sexual
offenses and is in no way repugnant to,
but on the other hand is in harmony with
the state laws.
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POINT V.
3B-8-5{3) OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE
ORDINANCES IS SPECIFIC IN ITS DESCRIPTION OF PROSCRIBED
CONDUCT AND THUS CANNOT BE VAGUE.
3B-8-5{3) of the South Salt Lake Ordinances provides
"that it shall be unlawful for a masseur to touch or
offer to touch or massage the genitalia of customers."
Appellants argue that this provision of the South
Salt Lake Ordinances is unconstitutional because of
The issue of vagueness is best exp.L1inc:d by

vagueness.

the standard which Utah has applied in various cases:
If the statute is so designed that persons
of ordinary intelligence, who would be law abiding
can tell what their conduct must be to conform to
its requirements, and it is susceptible of uniform
interpretation and application by those charged with
the responsibility of enforcing it, it is
invulnerable to an attack for vagueness.
See Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 Utah 2d 67, 72, 305 P.2d
870, 874 {1957};

State v. Packard, 122 Utah, 369, 376,

250 P.2d 561, 564 {1952); Henrie v. Rocky

Moun~ain

Packing

Corp., 113 Utah 444, 448, 202 P.2d 727, 729 (1949).
Applying the standard to the South Salt Lake Ordinance
JB-8-5(3)

it is clear to a person of ordinary intelligence

which conduct is unacceptable under the ordinance.
Appellants cite Champlin Re.fining Co. v. Corporation
com, 286

us

210, 76 L.Ed. 1062, 52 s.ct. 559 (1932)

and Jensen v. Salt Lake County, previously cited, to support

-17-
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the claim of vagueness.

Champlin concerned an Oklahoma

Oil Regulation, Jensen concerned licensing.

Appellants

do not show how the vagueness issue in either case influenc
the alleged vagueness in the South Salt Lake Ordinance.
Appellants also support their claim of vagueness
by calling upon two South Salt Lake City cases which were
tried in a Court of the Justice of the Peace.
cases alleged violations of 3B-8-5(3).

Both

Appellants

cite City of South Salt Lake v. Susan Mae Rosvall
No. 79-6559 and one other case.

No citation or defendant's

name is provided in the second case.
In Rosvall,

appell~ts

assert that the ordinance

does not require the act to be a commercial act for
a fee and that the offer to touch need not be confined
to the massage establishment.

Appellants assume this

interpretation because their jury instruction was
rejected.

In fact, the complaint against Rosvall

the date, time, and place of occurrance.

The

specif~

0mplaint

specifies that the act occurred at a massage establishment,
while Rosvall was acting as a masseur, and that Rosvall
offered to touch the genitalia of a customer.

Appellants

construct their analysis of the ordinance on the basis
of their interpretation of what a jury instruction should
have read.
In the second case, defendant was charged with
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violations of 3B-8-5(3).

Defendant, through counsel,

urged a jury instruction requiring the defendant actually
touch the genitalia before she could be convicted.
The instruction was rejected.

Again, appellants base

the vagueness issue of the ordinance on their
interpretation of a rejected jury instruction.
Neither case was conducted in a court of record.
The actual reason for rejection of the instructions, and
the judge's interpretation of the ordinance are not
available.
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POINT VI. THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE MAY ESTABLISH
MINIMUM AGE STANDARDS FOR MASSAGE PARLOR LICENSEES.
Section 3B-8-3(1)

6£ the South Salt Lake Massage

Ordinances provides that each individual desiring a
massage establishment license or masseur license shall
"be an individual at least 21 years of age."
The City of South Salt Lake has a responsibility
to protect the morals, health, and.welfare of the
community.

The massage ordinances, including

th~

crdliunce

in question, were fashioned for the purpose of fulfilling
those responsibilities.
The minimum age requirement is a reasonable
attempt of the City to regulate the massage parlor
business.

1nlere is a legitimate relationship between

the City's obligations to the community and the
ordinance it has enacted to achieve that end.
The City of South Salt Lake also has an interest in
protecting minors from possible sexual exploitation in
the massage parlor establishments.
There are numerous precedents for the establishment
of a minimum age requirement.

Utah Code Annotated,

Section 58-2-1 et seq. provides that persons seeking
licenses for various occupations must be 21 years of
age, including

architects, embalmers, barbers, chiropod~tl

dentists, surveyors, etc.
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The same minimum age requirement has been enforced
with regards to consumption of alcohol.
In Purdie v. University of Utah, 584 P.2d 831
(Utah 1978) , the court held that age may be a valid
classification as long as the reason for the classification
is based on a legitimate state interest.

-21Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT VII. CIVIL SANCTIONS ANO PENALTIES INCLUDED IN
THE SOUTH SALT LAKE MASSAGE ORDINANCES 00 NOT CONFLICT
WITH EXISTING STATE CONSPIRACY STATUTES.

JB-8-7 and JB-8-8 of the South Salt Lake Massage
Ordinances provide for civil sanctions and penalties
against the holder of a massage establishment license
"for any and all violations of the provisions of this
ordinance committed by his or her employees."

Sanctions

include license suspension or revocation and fines.
Appellants argue that this ordinance is
contrary to Utah State Law.

Appellants cite a section

of the State Criminal Code dealing with conspiracies,
76-4-201:

For purposes of this part, a person is guilty
of conspiracy when he, intending that conduct
constituting a crime be performed, agrees with
one or more persons to engage in or cause the
performance of such and any one of them commits
an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy,
except where the offense is a capital offense,
a felony against the person, arson, burglary, or
robbery, the overt act is not required for the
commission of conspiracy.
This section is limited to Part 2 Chapter 4 of the
Utah Criminal Code.

The controlling language of the

conspiracy statute is encompassed within the first
five words, "For purposes of this part."

careful

examination of the appellants brief will show that
these words have been eliminated or omitted from their
discussion of the statute.
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Since this statute is limited in its application,
it does not prohibit cities from enacting ordinances
which hold licensees accountable for the conduct of
employees on the premises.
Specifically, the legislature has enacted statutes
that do hold licensees accountable for the conduct of
persons on their premises.

A licensee may be held

responsible for persons who are drunk on his premises
(See U.C.A. 32-7-24).

A licensee may also be

h~ld

responsible for permitting persons to consume beer
on his premises.

(U.C.A. 32-7-19).

Courts have upheld convictions of licensees who
were charged for the conduct of their employees.
See Brodsky v. California State Board of Pharmacy,
344 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1959) and Clown's Den, Inc. v. Canjar,
518 P.2d 957 (Colo Ct. App, 1973).
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POINT VIII. THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE HAS AUTHORIZED
THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE TO REGULATE LIQUOR IN
MASSAGE PARLORS.
Section 3B-8-5{2) of the South Salt Lake Massage
Ordinances makes it unlawful to "serve, to store, or
allow to be served, or allow to be consumed, any alcoholic
beverages on the licensed premises of a massage establishmen
Appellant contends that this is an invalid attempt
to regulate liquor, an area of law that is
by Utah State Law.

pr~ern;;:ited

In defense of their position,

appellants cite so-called concessions of invalidity
made by Salt Lake County during their memorandum to the
3rd Judicial Court.

Appellants wrongly assume in their

brief that because South Salt ·Lake has adopted the
·wording in the County Statute, the City is also willing
to make identical concessions about the statute's

validi~.

On the contrary, the City of South Salt Lake
maintains that the power to regulate liquor on the

licens~

premises of a massage establishment is well founded in
statutory and case law.

Chapter 8 of the Utah Code

Annotated describes the power which has been reserved
for the cities in regulating liquor:
They may prohibit, e~cept as provided by
law, any person from knowingly having in his
possession any intoxica~ing liquor, and the
manufacture, sale, keeping or storing for sale,
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offering or exposing for sale, importing,
carrying, transporting, advertising,
distributing, giving away, exchanging, dispensing,
or serving of intoxicating liquors (U.C.A. 10-8-42)
Cities may enforce the same punishments and
prohibitions which are enforced by state law when they
occur within the jurisdiction of the municipality.
See American Fork City v. Charlier, 43 U 231, 134 P 739;
Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42

u.

596, 134 P. 558, and

American Fork City v. Briggs, 43

u.

252, 134 P. 747.

Cities may not enforce liquor ordinances where
there is a conflict between the city ordinance and the
state statutes.

Rogue v. Utah Liquor Control Commission,

500 P.2d 509 (1972) upheld the right of local authorities
to regulate the establishment of liquor stores through
zoning ordinances.

The decision overturned the rule

outlined in Salt Lake County v. Liquor Control Conunission,
357 P.2d 488 (1960), a case which appellants in Redwood Gym
cite.
Appellants in the South Salt Lake case do not
address state statutes in this area of law, nor do they
demonstrate a conflict in light of existing case law.
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POINT IX. THE CITY OF SOUTH SALT LAKE MAY REGULATE
THE SANITARY CONDITIONS OF MASSAGE PARLORS IN THE
INTEREST OF PUBLIC HEALTH.
Section JB-8-4 of the South Salt Lake Massage
Ordinances provides:

"All applications for a massage

establishment license shall be referred to the Salt Lake
City-County Board of Health for investigation and
a license shall be granted only after a finding by
the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health that

th~

proposed premises are sanitary enough to conduct
business therein without jeopardizing the public
health."
Appellants argue that this ordinance is beyond
the delegated authority of cities and that it is
unconstitutionally vague.
Indeed, the sanitary conditions in a massage
parlor establishment are well within the areas of
public health and welfare that the cities are obliged
to protect (See U.C.A. 10-8-84}.
With respect to vagueness, the appellants do not
have standing to object to the ordinance unless they can
show they are prejudiced by the ordinance or, are about
to be prejudiced by it.
Several cases isolate the effect a statute must
have on a party before it can be deemed unconstitutionally
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vague.

Consider the language in Cavaness v. Cox,

598 P.2d 349 (1979)

351-52:

The constitutionality of a statute is to
be considered in the light of the standing of
the party who seeks to raise the question and
of its particular application; and a person may
challenge the constitutionality of a statute
only when and as far as it is being, or is
about to be applied to his disadvantage.
This court took a similar position in State v.
Kallas when it held:
This court is committed to the rule that
an attack on the validity of a statute cannot
be made by parties whose interests have not been,
and are not about to be, prejudiced by the
operation of the statute.
The Court has explained its position if
appellants do not satisfy this requirement of
standing.

See Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (1978) p. 369:

In regard to plaintiff's contention, these
things are to be said generally about the
interpretations and application of a statute or
ordinance:
it is not our duty to indulge in
conjecture that the statute may be so distorted
or unreasonably applied that some innocent person
might come within its terms.
Rather, it is our
duty to assume that those who administer a statute
will do so with reason and common sense, in
accordance with its language and intent; and further,
that if there is a choice as to the matter of its
interpretation and application, that should be done
in a manner which will make it constitutional, as
opposed to one which would make it invalid.
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The City of South Salt Lake has not revoked
the license of any massage parlor because of violations
of this ordinance.

There are no cases pending where

violations of this ordinance may result in the
suspension or revocation of any licensed massage
parlor.

No licenses have been denied on this basis.

At best, the appellants are speculating that
their establishment may at some future time violate
this ordinance.
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POINT X. THE PROVISIONS OF THE SOUTH SALT LAKE
MASSAGE ORDINANCES ARE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT.
INDIVIDUAL
PROVISIONS OF THE ACT REMAIN IN EFFECT EVEN THOUGH OTHERS
MAY BE DEEMED INVALID.
Section 3B-8-9 of the South Salt Lake Ordinances
provides:

"In the event that any provision of this

ordinance is declared invalid for any reason, the
remaining sections shall remain in effect."
There are numerous provisions of the South Salt
Lake Ordinances that deal with varying aspects of
the Massage Parlor business.

This severability clause

was incorporated into the ordinances should any portion
of the act be declared invalid.

The clause is inserted

into the ordinances to voice. support for the individual
ordinances as well as for the ordinances as a uniform body.
Appellants argue that if one part of the South
Salt Lake Ordinances is found to be invalid, the remaining
provisions should likewise be invalidated because the
provisions are interrelated.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
provisions of a legislative act remain in effect, even
though a portion is held to be unconstitutional.
In Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com, previously
cited, The Supreme court struck down a portion of an
Oklahoma statute regulating the production of oil.
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In so doing, the Court held:
And if section 2 were to be held unconstitutional
the provisions on which the orders rest would
remain in force. The unconstitutionality of
a part of an Act does not necessarily defeat or
affect the validity of its remaining provisions.
Unless it is evident that the legislature sould
not have enacted those provisions which are within
its power, independently of that which is not, the
invalid part may be dropped if what is left is
fully operative as a law. (p. 234)
It is clear from this case that portions of the
South Salt Lake Ordinances may still remain in effect
even though a portion or portions are found to be
invalid.

A declaration that massaging the genitalia is

invalid, does not invalidate provisions governinq
etc.

licensi~,

The licensing requiremerits may remain operative as

a law, regardless of the outcome of issues involving
other provisions.
Continuing in the Champlin decision, the Court said:
Section 10 declares that the invalidity
of any part of the Act shall not in ~ny manner
affect the remaining portions. That discloses
an intention to make the Act divisible and creates
a presumption that, eliminating invalid parts, the
legislature would have been satisfied with what
remained and that the scheme of regulation
derivable from the other provisions would
have been enacted without regard to section 2.
(p.

235)

-30-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCLUSION
The South Salt Lake City Ordinances regulating
massage parlors are a valid exercise of police power.
Support for these ordinances is echoed in the
decisions of other jurisdictions at the federal
state levels.

~nd

Massage parlor ordinances similar to

the South Salt Lake Code have been sustained throughout
this country.

In fact, the propriety of such ordinances

is now so well recognized that many courts have refused
to rule on questions of their validity because they do not
raise "substantial questions of constitutionality."
The South Salt Lake Ordinances are in harmony
with the U.

s.

Constitution and with existing

state

laws.
The ordinances are clear in their intent.
Code applies equally to men and women.

The

Provisions of

the ordinances are also very specific in their descriptions
of proscribed conduct.
The City of South Salt Lake has a responsibility
to safeguard the health and morals of the community.
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These ordinances are a lawful and reasona~le means to
that end.
The decision of the Third Judicial Court of
Utah should be upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/be.- day of November, 1980,

~~,/
clltOriBCi~
h
v

=:-

Attorney for- ==nts-Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing

BRIEF OF RESPONDEN~ were served by han.y1delivering
the same on

the~_ day

~;'fjvL[~980,

of

to

the attorney for appellants:
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH
930 South State Street Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84057
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